EC'25: Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information
Paper presentation at the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'25), Stanford, CA, July 7, 2025: Title: Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information Authors: Dirk Bergemann, Marek Bojko, Paul Duetting, Renato Paes Leme, Haifeng Xu, Song Zuo Session: Multidimensional Screening Paper in the ACM Digital Library: https://doi.org/10.1145/3736252.3742578
Suggested videos
EC'25: Information Design in the Twenty-First Century: A Computer Science Perspective
ACM SIGecom · 25:25
EC'25: Thought about Economics and Computing and me
ACM SIGecom · 23:22
EC'25: Swap Regret and Correlated Equilibria Beyond Normal-Form Games
ACM SIGecom · 31:27
EC'25: Scoring Rules for a Theory of AI
ACM SIGecom · 1:04:07
EC'25: Prediction as a Service
ACM SIGecom · 1:09:54
EC'23: Algorithmic Mechanism Design: The Core Problem that "Stuck"
ACM SIGecom · 17:20
EC'25: On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods
ACM SIGecom · 26:37
EC'25: Learning Optimal Posted Prices for a Unit-Demand Buyer
ACM SIGecom · 25:00